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THURGOOD MARSHALL
DANIEL POLLIT*
"His was the eye of a lawyer who saw the deepest wounds in the social
fabric and used law to help heal them.... His was the mouth of a man
who knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice."
Sandra Day O'Connor'
Thurgood Marshall died on January 25, 1993, at the age of eighty-
four. Like Frederick Douglass before him, he "visioned a world
where none is lonely, none hunted, none alien."2 In Iris words, "he did
what he could with what he had,"'3 and that was more, much more,
than aplenty. The thousands of mourners who braved a bitter winter
chill to pay tribute at his coffin attest to that.4 He ranks in the strug-
gles for liberty and justice with the giants in Supreme Court history:
Earl Warren, Bill Brennan, Frank Murphy, Wiley Rutledge, Hugo
Black and Bill Douglas. His life is a reminder of the great promises of
equality in our Constitution. This article is dedicated to his memory.
Marshall was born in Baltimore in 1908, just a scant twelve years
after the Supreme Court held in Plessy v. Ferguson5 that it was per-
missible to segregate black citizens from white citizens in places of
public accommodation as long as the separate facilities were "equal."6
In the year of his birth, the Supreme Court held that it was permissi-
ble for Kentucky to prohibit the voluntary integration of black and
* Kenan Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill.
1. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES AND TRIBUTES IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ON
THE LIFE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF JusTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL, 153, House Document, 103-
244 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1994) (quoting Thurgood Marshall, WASH.
POST, January 26, 1993).
2. Id. at 33 (quoting the tribute of Hon. Bernard Sanders of Vermont who quoted from
ROBERT C. HAYDEN, FREDERICK DOUGLASS: "When freedom is finally won, when it is more
than the gaudy mumbo jumbo of politicians, this man, this Douglass, this former slave, this Ne-
gro beaten to his knees, exiled, visioning a world where none is lonely, none hunted, alien, this
man, superb in love and logic, this man shall be remembered.").
3. Id. at 5 (quoting the tribute of Hon. Timothy Roemer of Indiana).
4. Id. at 154 (quoting Felicity Barringer, Thousands Bid Farewell to Marshall, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 1993).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1, 140 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Ex-Justice Mar-
shall Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993 citing remarks of Yale Law professor Paul Gewertz, a
former law clerk for Marshall. "He grew up in a ruthlessly discriminatory world - a world in
which segregation of the races was pervasive and taken for granted, where lynchings were com-
mon, where the black man's inherent inferiority was proclaimed widely and wantonly." Id.
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white students at a private college,7 and there were eighty-nine re-
corded lynchings.8
The Baltimore of his youth was a "Jim Crow" town.9 It was a town
where blacks attended "colored schools" run by a white superinten-
dent who openly said, "Negroes don't deserve swimming pools." It
was a town where not a single downtown department store was open
to blacks; a town where not a single restroom for blacks could be
found downtown.' ° Marshall worked as a waiter at a time when black
waiters were generally called "George," sometimes "boy."" Segrega-
tion was the law and the practice of the land.
In a farewell news conference in 1991, Marshall was asked if Afri-
can-Americans were "free at last." He replied with a parable: a pull-
man porter once told Marshall that "he had been in every city in this
country and had never been in any city where he had to put his hand
up in front of his face to find out he was a Negro."' 2 No wonder
Marshall urged his colleagues on the Supreme Court to look at the
letter of the law, of course, but to keep in mind the soul of the
nation.' 3
Marshall's roots go back to a great-grandfather, kidnapped in the
Congo and sold as a slave to a plantation on the eastern shore of
Maryland. His paternal grandfather enlisted in the Union Army dur-
ing the Civil War and chose the name "Thoroughgood."' 4 Marshall
was named after this grandfather, but early on he shortened it to
"Thurgood." His mother was a teacher, and his father was a steward
at the all-white Gibson Island Club on the Chesapeake Bay. 15 In his
high school years, Marshall worked as a delivery boy after class and
worked his way through college by waiting on tables. 6
7. Berea v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
8. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1, 198 (quoting Thurgood Marshall, BLACKLETTER
JOURNAL, Spring, 1989).
9. "Jim Crow" makes reference to the character in a nineteenth century minstrel song.
The term became synonymous with "the systematic practice of discriminating against and sup-
pressing black people." Tim AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (Second College Edition, 1985).
10. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1, 174 (quoting Juan Williams, Marshall's Law,
WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1990).
11. Id. at 170 (quoting Roger Wilkins, Thurgood and Me, MOTHER JONES MAGAZINE'
(Nov.-Dec. 1991).
12. Id. at 73 (quoting the eulogy of Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut), See also
MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1, 151 (quoting Joan Biskupic, Thurgood Marshall, Retired
Justice, Dies, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1993).
13. Id. at 61 (quoting the eulogy made by Senator George Mitchell of Maine whose con-
cluding remarks included the words of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor).
14. Id. at 130 (quoting the eulogy given by Lucien Blackwell of Pennsylvania).
15. Id. at 148 (quoting Joan Biskupic, Thurgood Marshall, Retired Justice, Dies, WASH.
POST, Jan. 25, 1993).
16. Id.
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Marshall was a latebloomer. He was a "cutup" at Douglas High
School. When the students misbehaved, they were banished to the
basement until they memorized a paragraph of the Constitution. By
the time he graduated, Marshall could recite it all, forward and
backward."
Marshall went on to Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, bent on
becoming a dentist. A failing grade in biology put an end to that
dream. He continued his "hell raising" and was suspended because of
fraternity pranks.' 8
Lincoln, a college for black males, was founded by a Presbyterian
minister and staffed by an all-white faculty with Princeton creden-
tials.19 Marshall, along with two-thirds of his schoolmates, voted to
keep it that way. His mother had taught him to go along to get along
in a segregated society. Classmates Cab Calloway and Langston
Hughes kept up the drum beat for integration. They argued with Mar-
shall that his support of an all-white faculty evidenced a belief in his
own inferiority. The debate precipitated a radical shift in Marshall's
thinking. When the issue came up a second time, Marshall voted for
integration. He took an interest in his studies, earned a place on the
debate team, and graduated with honors.2"
Then it was off to law school at Howard University in the nation's
capital since the University of Maryland in Baltimore did not admit
blacks. He commuted each school day to save living expenses."' At
Howard he came under the sway of Dean Charles H. Houston who
epitomized how a dedicated teacher can make a difference, even
change a life. Houston drummed into a generation of students a mis-
sion of justice and racial equality. He taught that law should be an
instrument of liberation. He told the students they must acquire legal
knowledge and skills and put them to use as social engineers. The
secret, Houston said, was hard work. 2
Marshall took this to heart. He studied hard and graduated at the
top of his class. He caught the eye of Dean Houston, who decided
17. Id. at 143 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Ex-Justice Thurgood Marshall Dies at 84, N.Y.
Tim as, January 25, 1993). "Instead of making us copy out stuff on the blackboard after school
when we misbehaved, our teacher sent us down into the basement to learn parts of the Constitu-
tion. I made my way through every paragraph." Id. "In three years I knew the whole thing by
heart." Id. at 148 (quoting Joan Biskupic, Thurgood Marshall, Retired Justice, Dies, WASH. POST,
January 15, 1993).
18. Id. at 174 (quoting Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, WASH. POST, January 7, 1990).
19. Id. at 210 (quoting FRANK MAGILL, GREAT LivEs FROM HISTORY: THURGOOD
MARSHALL).
20. Id. at 175 (quoting Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, WASH. POST, January 7, 1990).
21. Id. at 21 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Ex-Justice Thurgood Marshall Dies at 84, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1990). He could not afford housing at the school and his mother pawned her
wedding and engagement rings to pay the tuition. Id.
22. Id.
1995]
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practical experience might round out Marshall's academic education.
Houston took his star pupil on a trip through the segregated south.
Barred from most motels and restaurants because of their race, they
stayed overnight with local black lawyers and ate from bags of fruit
they carried along the way. Returning home to Washington, Houston
asked Marshall to assist in the trial of George Crawford, a black man
charged with murdering a white man in Loudoun County, Virginia.
Crawford was convicted but given a life sentence. "We won," said
Marshall. "Anytime a Negro charged with killing a white man in Lou-
doun County, Virginia, gets off with life imprisonment, it's a victory.
Normally, they were hanging them in those days."23
With this practical apprenticeship behind him, Marshall went home
to Baltimore and opened an office. His mother sacrificed her living
room rug to make the office presentable.24 One of his earlier victories
was on behalf of Donald Murray who was denied admission to the
University of Maryland Law School because of his race. The Univer-
sity offered Murray a scholarship to attend an out-of-state school and
argued that this was sufficient under Plessy's "separate but equal"
doctrine. Marshall argued first that the option to leave the state for a
legal education was not "equal" to a legal education at home. At a
higher level, he stressed that "what is at stake here is more than the
rights of my client; it is the moral commitment stated in our country's
creed."25
Marshall spent the next three years representing the powerless and
the poor blacks of Baltimore and was soon one thousand dollars in
debt. 6 His repeated contacts with black defendants charged with cap-
ital crimes convinced him that the death penalty was immoral in prin-
ciple and discriminatory in application. For the local NAACP, he
negotiated with white store owners to hire blacks, and he worked with
John L. Lewis to unionize black and white steelworkers in
Baltimore.27
Dean Houston, who had left Howard Law School to head the
NAACP legal department, kept track of his star pupil and in 1936
invited Marshall to join him as special assistant at an annual salary of
$2,600.28 TWo years later Houston turned the legal reins of the organi-
zation over to Marshall. For the next twenty years, Marshall lived out
23. Id. at 176 (quoting Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1990).
24. Id.
25. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 540 (Md. 1936).
26. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1, 144 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Ex-Justice
Thurgood Marshall Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993).
27. Id. at 172 (quoting Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1990).
28. Id. at 144 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Ex-Justice Thurgood Marshall Dies at 84, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993).
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of a suitcase, traveling the dusty southern roads from courthouse to
courthouse, knocking holes in the walls of segregation.29
This was not easy, nor was Marshall free from physical danger.
Once Marshall defended two black men accused of shooting a police-
man. The incident in question started with a disagreement about a
radio. After a physical altercation with a white storekeeper over the
cost of repairing that radio, a black youth fled to the black section of
town. A mob gathered and gave chase. Shots were fired into homes,
shots were fired back. A policeman was hit. One defendant was ac-
quitted, the other was convicted.
After the trial, Marshall wanted to unwind over a drink and sought
out the local bootlegger who told him he had sold his last two bottles
to the judge. Leaving town, Marshall was stopped by the police, who
were irate that one of the defendants was acquitted. Marshall was
arrested on a trumped-up charge of, ironically, drunk driving. Mar-
shall was taken to the judge, who cleared him. Marshall hurried on to
Nashville, the next city where trial was scheduled, seriously in need of
a drink.30
On another occasion, Marshall was in Dallas to challenge the exclu-
sion of blacks from jury duty. Marshall learned that the Dallas Police
Chief had given orders to leave him alone, for the Chief personally
wanted the pleasure of assaulting Marshall. Marshall called the gover-
nor who assigned a State trooper to stand guard. This was fortunate
because, leaving the courthouse, Marshall came face to face with the
Chief. The Chief went for his gun, the State trooper intervened, and
Marshall scurried around the comer to safety.3 1
The risks and discomforts paid off in a string of Supreme Court vic-
tories: decisions holding that it was illegal to exclude blacks (or any
other racial group) from jury service,32 that it was illegal to force black
passengers to ride in the back of an interstate bus 33 or to sit in segre-
gated bus station facilities,' and that it was illegal to exclude blacks
from participation in the Texas primary elections.35
In 1948, Marshall persuaded the Supreme Court to outlaw judicial
enforcement of "restrictive covenants," private agreements whereby
owners of property bind themselves not to sell or lease to a person of
29. Id. at 137 (quoting Martin Weil & Stephanie Griffith, Marshall Transformed Nation in
the Courts, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1993). "It was hard even for a black man to find a place to
sleep or buy a meal." Id.
30. Id. at 139 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Ex-Justice Thurgood Marshall Dies at 84, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993).
31. Id. at 178 (quoting Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, WASHrNGTON POST, Jan. 7, 1990).
32. Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947).
33. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
34. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
35. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
1995]
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a designated race or color.36 These covenants were used widely
against blacks, Jews, American Indians, and almost any and all minori-
ties. It was estimated that eighty percent of the property of Chicago
was restricted this way.
Marshall's greatest triumph was in ending the "separate but equal"
doctrine in public education. The assault began in graduate educa-
tion.37 With these victories in place, Marshall aimed his guns at com-
pulsory segregation in public schools where the facilities for "colored"
and "white" schools were supposedly equal. He argued in this brief
that:
These infant appellants are asserting the most important claims that
can be put forward by children. The claim to their full measure of the
chance to learn and to grow and the inseparably connected, but even
more important claim to be treated as entire citizens of the society
into which they have been born. 38
A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, agreed
that in the field of public education "the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently une-
qual."' 39 Chief Justice Warren recognized that the case before the
Court raised the most significant issue of law in that generation and
went to the very soul of the nation. He wrote: "To separate black
children from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone." °
The suit Marshall filed against segregated education was a suit filed
as well against a complete social fabric.4' It raised issues of justice,
fairness and access to a broad range of human experience. "White
only" signs came down not only in public schools, but in publicly
owned facilities across the nation, including courtrooms, golf courses
and even state-owned liquor stores.
36. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
37. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (Missouri could not send quali-
fied black applicants to out-of-state law schools); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 332
U.S. 631 (1948) (Oklahoma could not deny blacks admission to the state law school if it was
available to whites); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Texas could not relegate black stu-
dents to a "black" law school qualitatively inferior to the "white" law school); McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 63 (1950) (Oklahoma could not relegate a graduate student,
once admitted, to the "colored" sections of classrooms, libraries and cafeterias).
38. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1, 83 (quoted by Senator John Glenn of Ohio).
39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
40. Id. at 494.
41. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1,205 (quoting an address given by Thurgood Mar-
shall at the Law Day Luncheon, University of Miami, Apr. 27, 1966). "What crumbled was not
merely a network of legal rules; it was a whole social system bent on keeping the Negroes in a
position of inferiority, a social system which relied on and was inspired by Jim Crow law." Id.
6
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In 1961 President Kennedy appointed Marshall to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sitting in New York and Con-
necticut. Like most things in Marshall's life, this did not come easy.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy fought the idea because of the
"political cost" of getting Marshall confirmed. Nonetheless, President
Kennedy sent Marshall's name to the Senate Judiciary Committee for
its "advice and consent." James Eastland of Mississippi chaired the
committee and refused to schedule hearings on the nomination for
eight months. Finally, a deal was struck. Eastland instructed the At-
torney General to tell the President that Eastland would "give him the
nigger" if Kennedy would nominate Harold Cox, a Mississippi segre-
gationist, to a district court seat. Kennedy nominated Cox, and Mar-
shall was confirmed by the Senate.42
On the Court of Appeals Marshall had the opportunity to relearn
the law of commerce, business, taxation, and labor relations. He con-
tinued to protect the rights of criminal defendants, holding, for exam-
ple, that waivers of the right to counsel must be deliberate and
intentional,43 that the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy prohibition
is applicable to the states," and that the Mapp v. Ohio decision ex-
cluding the use of illegally obtained evidence should be applied
retroactively.45
In 1965 President Johnson appointed Marshall to serve as the first
African-American Solicitor General representing interests and con-
cerns of the United States before the Supreme Court in cases of all
kinds. Once again he had the opportunity to litigate the cause of civil
rights. He convinced the Supreme Court that the murder of the three
civil rights workers in Mississippi was a federal case,' that suspects
taken into police custody must be informed of their rights to an attor-
ney,47 and that the Virginia poll tax unlawfully discriminated against
the poor.48
In 1967 President Johnson nominated Marshall to be the first Afri-
can-American to serve on the Supreme Court. Marshall was emi-
nently qualified. He had litigated innumerable cases in both state and
federal courts, at trial and appellate levels. He had served as a judge
on the United States Court of Appeals. He had represented the gov-
42. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1, 181 (quoting Juan Williams, Marshall's Law,
WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1990).
43. United States v. Lavelle, 306 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1962).
44. United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965).
45. United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
1995]
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ermnent as the Solicitor General. He had argued and won twenty-
nine cases in the Supreme Court.49 But still he ran into problems.
Four Senators on the Judiciary Committee fought his nomination:
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, James Eastland of Mississippi,
John McClellan of Arkansas, and Sam Ervin of North Carolina.
When Marshall finally was confirmed by a vote of sixty-nine to eleven,
President Johnson called to congratulate him and added, "I never
went through so much hell."5
During his twenty-four years on the bench, Marshall kept up the
good fight for liberty and justice, even when, with newer appoint-
ments, the odds progressively got worse and the victories fewer. His
opinions grace the law school texts and are well worth mentioning
here. As Marshall put it, "Law can change things for the better and
even changes the heart of men, but law has an educational function
also." 5
1
Marshall spent the better part of his NAACP years fighting against
the segregated school systems in the south. He continued this fight for
integrated education as a Supreme Court Justice. When the majority
held that a federal court lacked authority to order the busing of black
school children in Detroit into the neighboring white suburban areas,
Marshall dissented with the dire prediction that "unless our children
begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever
learn to live together."52
In San Antonio v. Rodriguez,53 the majority held that it was permis-
sible for Texas to use local property taxes to finance public education,
even though children in poor school districts had far fewer educa-
tional dollars than children in neighboring wealthy districts. Marshall
dissented: "The rights of every American to an equal start in life, so
far as the provision of a state service as important as education is con-
cerned, is far too vital to permit state discrimination."54
The Court in the famous Bakke case held that the medical school at
the University of California at Davis denied equal protection of the
49. By the time that President Johnson appointed him, Marshall had argued thirty-two
cases before the Supreme Court and had won twenty-nine of them, fourteen as a private lawyer
for the NAACP, eighteen of them as the Solicitor General. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note
1, 142 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Ex-Justice Thurgood Marshall Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 1993).
50. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1, 162 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Ex-Justice
Thurgood Marshall Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993). Johnson later said that placing Mar-
shall on the Supreme Court was "the right thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man and
the right place." Id.
51. Id.
52. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974).
53. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
54. Id. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8
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white applicants when it set aside places for qualified minority appli-
cants who scored lower on the standardized tests than did the white
applicants who were rejected. Marshall wrote an impassioned dissent:
It is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-
based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold
that a class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible. In
declining to so hold, today's judgment ignores the fact that for several
hundred years Negroes have been discriminated against, not as indi-
viduals, but rather solely because of the color of their skins. It is un-
necessary in 20th century American to have individual Negroes
demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the
racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of
wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact. The experience
of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree,
from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery
alone but also that a whole people were marked inferior by law. And
that mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting
pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color, he
never made it into the melting pot.5f
Marshall favored the so-called "set aside" programs to ensure that
minorities, long shunted aside, could get a piece of the economic ac-
tion. He wrote a special concurring opinion when the Court affirmed
the authority of Congress to "set aside" a portion of the government
construction business to minorities because:
By upholding this race-conscious remedy, the Court accords Congress
the authority necessary to undertake the task of moving our society
toward a state of meaningful equality of opportunity, not an abstract
version of equality in which the effects of past discrimination would be
forever frozen into our social fabric. I applaud this result.
56
Marshall championed the rights of all of society's rejects, including
the poor. In United States v. Kras,17 the Court held that it was permis-
sible to charge a fee of fifty dollars to file bankruptcy. Kras was too
poor to go bankrupt, but the majority reasoned that the fee could be
paid over time in amounts "less than the price of a movie, and a little
more than the cost of a pack or two of cigarettes. ' 58 Marshall, in his
dissent, reminded the majority that "over 800,000 families in the Na-
tion had annual incomes of less than $1000 or $19.23 a week" and that
the desperately poor almost never go to see a movie. "They have
more important things to do with the little money they have - like
attempting to provide comfort to a gravely ill child, as Kras must." He
55. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400-01 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
56. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980).
57. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
58. Id. at 449.
1995]
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scolded the majority that "it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the
Constitution to be premised on unfounded assumptions about how
people live."59
Marshall defended the right of a poor person to marry, even though
he was behind in child support payments. In Zablocki v. Redhail,60 he
wrote for the Court that Wisconsin could not deny a marriage license
to an applicant because he had not met his support obligations. "The
State," he said, "already has numerous other means for exacting com-
pliance with support obligations, means that are at least as effective as
the instant statute and yet do not impinge upon the right to marry."'61
Marshall defended the rights of the mentally retarded. In City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,62 the Court reversed the city's
denial of a special use permit for a group home for the mentally re-
tarded. It applied a "rational relation" standard, insisting that the
mentally retarded did not constitute a class needing special protection
of the law. Marshall agreed with the end result of the case but vehe-
mently disagreed with the reasoning. He wrote that a "heightened
scrutiny" of laws implicating the mentally retarded is necessary
because:
The mentally retarded have been subject to a lengthy and tragic his-
tory of segregation and discrimination that can only be called gro-
tesque.... A regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation
soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed,
paralleled the worst excesses of Jim Crow .... 6 For the retarded, just
as for Negroes and women, much has changed in recent years, but
much remains the same: outdated statutes are still on the books, and
irrational fears or ignorance, traceable to the prolonged social and cul-
tural isolation of the retarded, continue to stcmie recognition of the
dignity and individuality of retarded people.
Marshall was quick to protect the rights of women with unwanted
pregnancies. In Beal v. Doe,65 he disagreed with the majority's hold-
ing that the federal Medicaid program permitted states to refuse to
fund non-therapeutic abortions. In a separate dissent,' Marshall
wrote that "nonwhite women obtain abortions at nearly twice the rate
of white women" and are statistically more dependent on Medicaid
for this health care.67 He wrote that "at some point a showing that
59. Id at 459 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
61. Id. at 389.
62. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
63. Id. at 461.
64. Id at 467.
65. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
66. Id. at 454 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. Id at 459-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10
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state action has a devastating impact on the lives of minority racial
groups must be relevant. 68
In Harris v. McRae,69 the majority of the Court upheld the Hyde
Amendment, denying public funding for abortions even when medi-
cally necessary. Marshall dissented because the decision "represents a
cruel blow to the most powerless members of our society."70 He
added:
If abortion is medically necessary and a funded abortion is unavaila-
ble, they must resort to back-alley butchers, attempt to induce an
abortion themselves by crude and dangerous methods, or suffer the
serious medical consequences of attempting to carry the fetus to
term.... The predictable result of the Hyde Amendment will be a
significant increase in the number of poor women who will die or suf-
fer significant health damage because of an inability of procuring nec-
essary medical service.7 1
Finally, in H.L. v. Matheson,72 he disagreed with the majority's
holding that Utah could require doctors to notify the parents of a mi-
nor prior to performing an abortion. He reminded his colleagues that
not every family conforms to their ideal images, and "parental consul-
tation hardly seems a legitimate state purpose where ... a hostile or
abusive parental response is assured, or where the minor's fears of
such a response deter her from the abortion she desires."73
Marshall felt strongly the need to protect the common citizen
against abuse by those in authority. In a case strikingly reminiscent of
A Man for All Seasons,74 an undercover police officer obtained a job
as a handyman and chauffeur with a man named Baldwin. For the
next six months, he lived in Baldwin's house, seeking evidence of co-
caine use. The Court's view was that one takes a knowing risk when
one invites someone into his home. Based on this reasoning, the
Court refused to examine the federal court of appeal's determination
that there was no Fourth Amendment protection against this type of
secret police intrusion.75 Marshall dissented.76 He wrote that the
Fourth Amendment protection should not depend on this legal fiction.
"When we hire a babysitter, housekeeper, or invite a neighbor into
68. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
70. Id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
73. ld. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. A Man for All Seasons is a modem play written by Robert Bolt about the life of Sir
Thomas More (1478-1535). The title phrase comes from a passage written about More by Rob-
ert Whittinton, an English writer who was a contemporary of More: "And as time requireth, a
man of marvelous mirth and pastimes, and sometimes of as sad a gravity; a man for all seasons."
75. United States v. Baldwin, 621 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1980).
76. Baldwin v. United States, 450 U.S. 1045 (1981).
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our homes, we should not be required to anticipate, constitutionally,
that this person might be a government agent sent on a secret spy
mission."77
Marshall dissented in another Fourth Amendment case, Florida v.
Bostick.78 The police made a sweep of a bus going north from Miami.
They asked for permission to search all of the luggage and found
drugs in Bostick's bags. The Court found no violation of the Fourth
Amendment, no "unreasonable search and seizure" because of Bos-
tick's consent to the search. Marshall opposed these "dragnet-style
sweeps" and wrote: "It is exactly because this 'choice' is no 'choice' at
all that the police engage in this technique. '79
Long remembered will be Marshall's holding in Stanley v. Georgia8"
indicating his concern for the First Amendment's freedom of speech,
and the Fourth Amendment's privacy of the home. Police officers
searched Stanley's home for bookmaking evidence. They didn't find
any, but they did come across some obscene films. Stanley was con-
victed of possessing obscene materials and appealed. Marshall wrote
the opinion reversing the conviction. He wrote that private possession
of obscene material by an adult may not be made criminal, for "[i]f
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a state has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch."'"
There is no better proof of Marshall's belief in the Bill of Rights
than his dissent in United States v. Salerno,82 where the majority up-
held a "pre-trial detention" law. The federal statute, in Marshall's
words, "declares that a person innocent of any crime may be jailed
indefinitely, pending the trial of allegations which are legally pre-
sumed to be untrue, if the Government shows to the satisfaction of a
judge that the accused is likely to commit crimes at any time in the
future. '8 3 He argued that the statute violated both the Eighth
Amendment right to bail and the presumption of innocence embed-
ded in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.s4 Such statutes, he
concluded, "are consistent with the usages of tyranny and the excesses
of what bitter experience teaches us to call the police state."8 5
77. I& at
78. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
79. Id. at 450.
80. 397 U.S. 557 (1969).
81. Id at 565.
82. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
83. id. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 762 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Marshall long lamented the failure of the Court to insist that those
charged with capital offenses be assured "competent" assistance of
counsel. Typically, he dissented in Strickland v. Washington 6 with
these words:
The majority contends that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when
a manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was
represented by a manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree.
Every defendant is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigor-
ously and conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer.87
He thought that not only able counsel but other experts, as well,
should be made available to indigents on trial. In Ake v. Oklahoma,'
Marshall wrote for the majority that an indigent defendant who made
a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense was
likely to be an issue at trial was entitled to have the assistance of a
psychiatrist in presenting his case. 9
When North Carolina argued that it would be too costly to provide
prisoners with access to the courts (with law libraries and lawyers),
Marshall responded: "The cost of protecting a constitutional right
cannot justify its total denial."'
Marshall might well be best remembered for his staunch opposition
to the death penalty in whatever form and for whatever reason. In
Furman v. Georgia,9 he wrote a sixty page concurring opinion which
included the following passage:
In striking down capital punishment, this Court does not malign our
system of government. On the contrary, it pays homage to it. Only in
a free society could right triumph in difficult times and could civiliza-,
tion record its magnificent advancement. In recognizing the humanity
of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the highest tribute. We achieve
a major milestone in the long road up from barbarism. 92
Four years later the Supreme Court reached a different conclusion,
this time upholding the death penalty.93 Marshall wrote a poignant
dissent, noting that he had earlier concluded that the death penalty is
a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments:
That continues to be my view.... I have no intention of retracing the
long and tedious journey that led to my conclusion in Furman.94 The
86. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
87. Id. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
89. Id. at 69.
90. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977).
91. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
92. Id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
93. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
94. Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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mere fact that the community demands the murderer's life in return
for evil he has done cannot sustain the death penalty....9 To be
sustained under the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty must
"comport with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the
Amendment". ... Under these standards, the taking of life "because
the wrongdoer deserves it" surely must fall, for such a punishment has
at its very basis the total denial of the wrongdoer's dignity and
worth.9 6
These cases indicate that the life of a Supreme Court Justice is not
an easy one. But the twinkle never left Marshall's eye. Wherever he
went, he had a story for almost every occasion, often at his own ex-
pense. At one Supreme Court conference he told colleagues a story
about a little boy who asked for his autograph and gave him eight
cards to sign. "Why eight?" Marshall asked. " 'Cause." the boy re-
plied, "eight of yours gets me one of Willie Mays."'97
Presidents are anxious to fill the Supreme Court vacancies with per-
sons they admire and, as a result, keep a close eye on the health of the
sitting Justices. In 1970, Marshall was in the Bethesda Naval Hospital
with pneumonia. A doctor told him that President Nixon had asked
for his medical reports. Marshall told the doctor he could send the
medical records to Nixon, but only with two words written on the
outside of the folder: "Not Yet." 9
There were many erroneous reports of Marshall's death. On one
such occasion, Chief Justice Warren Burger called, urging Mrs. Mar-
shall to stay calm. "I am calm, " she replied, "because he's sitting
right here having his dinner." 99 To the repeated questions about his
intent to retire, the stock answer was: "I have a lifetime appointment
and I intend to serve it. I expect to die at 110, shot by a jealous hus-
band." °° When he did retire at age 83 and was asked what was
wrong, he replied: "I'm old.'' 1°1
His humor was sometimes biting. When it was suggested that the
Court participate in the Bicentennial of the Constitution with a cere-
monial return to Philadelphia, Marshall said somebody had better get
him short pants and a tray so he could serve the coffee, because that is
surely what he would have been doing in 1787.12
95. Id. at 228 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Id at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1, 162 (quoting Stuart Taylor, Jr., Glimpses of
Thurgood Marshall, THE AM. LAW., March, 1993).
98. Id. at 184 (quoting Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1990).
99. Id. at 185.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 61 (quoting the eulogy given by Senator George Mitchell of Maine).
102. Id
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Marshall was repelled by the lavish praise heaped on the original
Constitution by President Reagan, Chief Justice Burger, and many
others. Almost alone, Marshall denounced its perpetuation of slavery
and the disenfranchisement of women. He told a bar association that
the government of the framers "was defective from the start, requiring
several amendments, a civil war and momentous social transformation
to attain respect for the individual freedoms and human rights that we
hold as fundamental today." 103
The effects of the framers' compromise on slavery, he continued,
"have remained for generations. They arose from the contradiction
between guaranteeing liberty and justice for all, and denying both to
Negroes." He concluded that:
In this bicentennial year we may not all participate in the festivities
with flag-waving fervor. Some may more quietly commemorate the
suffering, struggle and sacrifice that has triumphed over much of what
was wrong with the original document, and observe the anniversary
with hopes not realized and promises not fulfilled.' 4
At his funeral, Reverend Nathan Baxter had this to say:
Justice Marshall lived a full and faithful life. He fought the good fight.
He finished his course .... Just after his eighty-fourth birthday he had
these words to say, which we must all, I believe, hold close to our
hearts. He said this: "The battle for racial and economic justice is not
yet won. Indeed it has barely, barely begun. The legal system can
force open doors and sometimes knock down the walls, but it cannot
build bridges. That job," he said, "belongs to me, and to you, and to
you, and to you, and to you, to all of us. That job belongs to me and
you." But then he said this: "Take a chance, take a chance, won't you,
and knock down the fences that divide, tear apart the wall that impris-
ons, reach, for freedom lies just on the other side." Bless you, my
Justice. May light perpetual shine upon you.'0 5
103. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Marshall Sounds Critical Note on Bicentennial, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1987, at Al.
104. Id. at B18.
105. MEMORIAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1, 100.
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